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How Not to Communicate Material and Imma-
terial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls* 
Wanda A. Wallace 
The University of Rochester 
In the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) "Statement on With­
drawal of Proposal to Require Reports on Internal Accounting Controls" (June 
6, 1980) the SEC stated its desire that 
. . . the action announced today will encourage further voluntary 
initiatives and permit public companies a maximum of flexibility in 
experimenting with various approaches to public reporting on internal 
accounting control (and) . . . auditor association with such statements, 
(p. H-1) 
The Commission pointed out that the proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) on "Reporting on Internal Accounting Control" (issued 
December 31, 1979 and adopted as SAS 30 in 1980) provides a framework for 
such public reporting. However, while SAS 30 does outline the possible report 
forms related to internal accounting control which can be prepared by the CPA, 
including the necessity of disclosing material weaknesses and permission to 
disclose immaterial weaknesses, if desired, it does not provide any directions 
or illustrations of how these disclosures can be communicated in a meaningful 
form—particularly to the general public. While experimentation may be 
desirable as a means of improving disclosure practices, problems can be 
created for companies and auditors alike if the results of these experiments are 
misinterpreted. 
This paper presents survey evidence which supports the likely diversity in 
financial statement users' interpretation of the effect of internal control points 
(possible disclosures of material or immaterial weaknesses) on report users' 
assessment of management. This evidence, as well as the ranking of the 
various possible report forms on internal accounting control which have been 
discussed in the literature, provide some direction as to the preferred form and 
content of future control disclosures. An analysis is given of the extent to which 
prior beliefs may have influenced survey responses with respect to 
(1) Auditors' present responsibilities. 
(2) The limitations of internal control and audit procedures. 
* This paper is based on a research project which was funded by a grant from the Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell Foundation through its Research Opportunities in Auditing Program. The views 
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell Foundation. 
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(3) The state of the art in the evaluation of internal accounting control. 
(4) The expected costs of expanded study and evaluation of controls. 
In addition, the content of disclosure in management reports regarding internal 
control and related auditors' responsibilities is analyzed. The results are then 
assimilated to draw policy implications for the profession. 
Survey Methodology 
Before the SEC withdrew its proposal to require reports on internal 
accounting control, a survey was conducted of the primary "stakeholder 
groups" with regard to internal control disclosure policies. Table 1 summarizes 
the basis of selection, demographic characteristics of the groups sampled, and 
the response rates. The selected sample is drawn from a number of different 
stakeholder groups and different criteria of selection are applied within each 
sample group to avoid the selection bias which is possible when only one group 
is tested or when asset size of the respondent is the sole criterion of selection. 
The demographics of the samples selected were investigated and found to be 
similar to publicly reported data available through Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. 
(1974 to 1980), other survey data, and casual empiricism regarding the 
characteristics of the more general populations from which each sample was 
drawn.1 
Table 2 reports significant differences of opinion across groups regarding 
how internal control points which commonly appear in management letters 
affect the evaluation of management. 
Interpretation of Internal Control Points 
Specifically, it is of interest that CPAs do not perceive the lack of internal 
auditors to be as negative an influence on their assessment of management as 
the other respondents. Similarly, CPAs' interpretation of how important the 
presence of an audit committee is in evaluating management differs substan­
tially from the other respondents. Government respondents are, in combina­
tion with the pilot sample respondents, the most willing to accept a periodic 
inventory system without penalizing management. Government is harsher in 
its evaluation of the significance of all of the internal control points being cited 
than all other groups. The repetition of the points between years is considered 
a rather severe flaw by mutual fund, government, and management re­
spondents. In assessing the effect the size of a company has in evaluating 
management, in view of the listed internal control points, the common stock 
insurance investment officers, CFAs, and private placement groups give least 
attention to the size factor in evaluating a firm's control adequacy. In general, 
the "yes" respondents' comments indicated that expectations for smaller 
companies' controls are lower than for larger companies, e.g., 
Small companies, particularly privately-held firms may frequently be 
managed effectively without many of the formal procedures and 
practices described above. (private placement) 
However, incomplete consensus on the rationale underlying the response is 
indicated by the following marginal comment: 
28 
TA
BL
E 
1 
SA
M
PL
E 
SU
M
M
AR
Y
 S
TA
TI
ST
IC
S 
B
oa
rd
 o
f 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
 
&
 A
ud
it
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 
M
em
be
rs
 
Co
m
m
on
 
St
oc
k 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
O
ff
ic
er
s 
(I
n
su
ra
n
ce
) 
C
er
ti
fi
ed
 
F
in
an
ci
al
 
A
na
ly
st
 
M
ut
ua
l 
Fu
nd
 
A
na
ly
st
 
GA
O
 
E
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
L
en
di
ng
 
O
ff
ic
er
s 
C
er
ti
fi
ed
 
P
u
b
li
c 
A
cc
ou
nt
an
ts
 
C
on
tr
ol
le
rs
 
fo
r 
D
JI
A
 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 
P
ri
va
te
 
P
la
ce
m
en
t 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
O
ff
ic
er
s 
(I
n
su
ra
n
ce
) 
T
ot
al
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
P
il
ot
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 
RE
SP
O
NS
ES
: 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
s 
In
cl
ud
ed
 
in
 
F
re
qu
en
cy
 T
ab
le
 
12
 
29
 
9 
4 
4 
13
 
14
 
12
 
35
 
13
2 
15
 
AD
JU
ST
ED
 S
AM
PL
E:
 
44
 
56
 
19
 
9 
5 
20
 
34
 
25
 
57
 
26
9 
15
 
RE
SP
O
NS
E
 P
ER
CE
NT
AG
E 
=
 
10
0 
R
es
po
ns
es
 
A
dj
us
te
d 
Sa
m
pl
e 
27
. 3
%
 
51
.8%
 
47
.4%
 
44
.4%
 
80%
 
65
%
 
41
.2%
 
48
%
 
61
.4%
 
49
.1
%
 
N
/A
 
A
ge
 
v
 
(y
ea
rs
) 
(δ
) 
58
.2
 
(1
0.
6)
 
38
.2
 
(6
.5
) 
40
.1
4 
(7
.1
1)
 
39
.0
 
(5
.4
8)
 
47
.3
 
(1
0.
3)
 
46
.0
 
(1
1.
4)
 
47
.7
5 
(9
.4
01
) 
45
.1
 
(7
.9
2)
 
39
.4
 
(7
.3
4)
 
42
.9
4*
 
(9
.8
9)
 
32
.7
 
(1
1.
9)
 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
(y
ea
rs
) 
32
.3
 
(7
.6
3)
 
12
.3
3 
(5
.7
) 
17
.9
 
(9
.5
) 
16
.3
 
(3
.8
6)
 
23
.5
 
(9
.1
1)
 
17
.8
 
(9
.5
3)
 
22
.4
6 
(9
.6
8)
 
23
.5
 
(1
0.
61
) 
13
.6
 
(6
.6
) 
18
.0
 
(9
.6
8)
 
20
.2
 
(1
6.
5)
 
CP
A
 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
(1
 =
 y
es
) 
.1
7 
(.
39
) 
.0
69
 
(.
25
8)
 
0.
0 
(0
.0
) 
.2
5 
(.
50
) 
.7
5 
(.
50
) 
0.
0 
(0
.0
) 
1.
0 
(0
.0
) 
.3
3 
(1
.6
3)
 
.1
14
 
(.
32
3)
 
.2
3 
(.
42
4)
 
.5
0 
(.
52
) 
# 
B
oa
rd
 o
f 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
**
 
(R
an
ge
 =
 1
 t
o 
8)
 
3.
42
 
(2
.5
4)
 
--
--
--
--
3.
42
 
(2
.5
4)
 
7.
0 
(1
.4
1)
 
# 
A
ud
it
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
s*
* 
(R
an
ge
 =
 0
 t
o 
5)
 
1.
7 
(1
.9
2)
 
--
--
--
--
-
--
--
1.
7 
(1
.9
) 
3.
0 
(2
.8
3)
 
29 
•T
he
se
 d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
re
la
te
 t
o 
th
e 
To
ta
l 
Ma
il
 S
am
pl
e 
pl
us
 
th
e 
Pi
lo
t 
Sa
mp
le
. 
**
Nu
mb
er
s 
co
rr
es
po
nd
 t
o 
th
e 
qu
an
ti
ty
 o
f 
di
ff
er
en
t 
co
mp
an
ie
s 
on
 w
ho
se
 b
oa
rd
 
(o
r 
au
di
t 
co
mm
it
te
e)
 t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 s
er
ve
s.
 
NO
TE
: 
Th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 s
el
ec
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 
sa
mp
le
s 
fo
ll
ow
s:
 
•B
oa
rd
 o
f 
Di
re
ct
or
 a
nd
 
Au
di
t 
Co
mm
it
te
e 
me
mb
er
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
Dow
 
Jo
ne
s 
In
du
st
ri
al
 A
ve
ra
ge
 
(D
JI
A)
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 
a 
ra
nd
om
 
sa
mp
le
 f
ro
m 
th
e 
Di
re
ct
or
y 
of
 D
ir
ec
to
rs
 
•5
6 
Co
mm
on
 S
to
ck
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t 
Of
fi
ce
rs
 r
ep
re
se
nt
in
g 
li
fe
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
mp
an
ie
s 
ho
ld
in
g 
80
% 
of
 a
ll
 U.
S.
 
Li
fe
 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
Co
mp
an
ie
s'
 
as
se
ts
 
•A
ll
 
Ce
rt
if
ie
d 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
An
al
ys
t 
me
mb
er
s 
of
 T
he
 
Ro
ch
es
te
r 
So
ci
et
y 
of
 S
ec
ur
it
y 
An
al
ys
ts
 
In
c.
 
•9
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s 
of
 t
he
 s
ix
 l
ar
ge
st
 m
ut
ua
l 
fu
nd
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
•5
 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 s
ta
ff
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
Ge
ne
ra
l 
Ac
co
un
ti
ng
 
Of
fi
ce
 (
GA
O)
, 
who
 
we
re
 k
no
wl
ed
ge
ab
le
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
in
te
rn
al
 
co
nt
ro
l 
an
d 
cu
rr
en
t 
SE
C 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
, 
as
 
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 b
y 
a 
GAO
 
st
af
f 
me
mb
er
 
•S
en
io
r 
Co
mm
er
ci
al
 L
en
di
ng
 O
ff
ic
er
 o
f 
th
e 
te
n 
la
rg
es
t 
ba
nk
s 
in
 t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
pe
rm
an
en
t 
ca
pi
ta
l 
fu
nd
s,
 
an
d 
te
n 
of
fi
ce
rs
 u
ti
li
ze
d 
in
 a
 p
ri
or
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
st
ud
y 
wh
o 
we
re
 i
de
nt
if
ie
d 
as
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
of
 s
op
hi
st
ic
at
ed
 
ac
co
un
ti
ng
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
us
er
s 
by
 
th
e 
Ro
be
rt
 M
or
ri
s 
As
so
ci
at
es
 
(t
he
 a
ut
ho
r 
is
 i
nd
eb
te
d 
to
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
 C
as
ey
 o
f 
Ha
rv
ar
d 
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 f
or
 t
hi
s 
sa
mp
le
) 
•A
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
 o
f 
th
e 
la
rg
es
t 
37
 C
PA
 
fi
rm
s 
as
 
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
AI
CP
A 
(l
es
s 
3 
fi
rm
s 
wh
o 
in
di
ca
te
d 
ti
me
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 
wo
ul
d 
pr
ec
lu
de
 
th
ei
r 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n)
 
© 
•C
on
tr
ol
le
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
DJ
IA
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
(3
0 
le
ss
 5
 f
ir
ms
 t
ha
t 
re
sp
on
de
d 
th
ei
r 
co
mm
en
ts
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
di
re
ct
ly
 t
o 
th
e 
SE
C)
 
•5
7 
ac
ti
ve
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
nt
s 
in
 d
ir
ec
t 
pl
ac
em
en
t 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
, 
al
so
 r
ep
re
se
nt
in
g 
th
os
e 
li
fe
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
mp
an
ie
s 
ho
ld
in
g 
80
% 
of
 U
.S.
 
Li
fe
 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
Co
mp
an
ie
s'
 a
ss
et
s 
(t
he
 a
ut
ho
r 
is
 i
nd
eb
te
d 
to
 P
ro
fe
ss
or
s 
Be
ns
to
n 
an
d 
Kr
as
ne
y 
of
 t
he
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y 
of
 
Ro
ch
es
te
r 
fo
r 
th
is
 
sa
mp
le
) 
•T
he
 p
il
ot
 
sa
mp
le
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
tw
o 
co
mm
on
 s
to
ck
 
in
ve
st
me
nt
 o
ff
ic
er
s 
of
 a
 m
ut
ua
l 
fu
nd
, 
si
x 
ma
na
ge
rs
 a
nd
 
pa
rt
ne
rs
 
of
 a
 
CP
A 
fi
rm
, 
th
re
e 
co
mm
er
ci
al
 
le
nd
in
g 
of
fi
ce
rs
, 
tw
o 
co
nt
ro
ll
er
s,
 
an
d 
tw
o 
au
di
t 
co
mm
it
te
e/
bo
ar
d 
of
 d
ir
ec
to
r 
me
mb
er
s-
-t
he
se
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
we
re
 o
bs
er
ve
d 
du
ri
ng
 
co
mp
le
ti
on
 
of
 t
he
 
te
st
 i
ns
tr
um
en
t 
an
d 
th
en
 i
nt
er
vi
ew
ed
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
pr
ob
le
ms
 i
n 
co
mp
le
ti
ng
 
th
e 
qu
es
ti
on
na
ir
e 
an
d 
su
gg
es
ti
on
s 
as
 
to
 p
os
si
bl
e 
re
vi
si
on
s;
 s
om
e 
ad
ju
st
me
nt
s 
re
su
lt
ed
 
TABLE 2 
EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT (A PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES) 
INSTRUCTIONS: The following is a l i s t of internal control points that might appear in a 
management letter issued by an external auditor to a medium-sized client (i.e., 
total sales of the client are approximately $50 million). Please indicate 
whether any of these points would affect your view of the quality of management-
i.e., the degree to which management is f u l f i l l i n g its responsibilities to 
stockholders and creditors. 
INTERNAL CONTROL POINTS 
Consider each statement independently; circle your response. 
Don't know 
None 
Slightly negative 
Negative 
Extremely negative 
If i t is not implemented, 
management should be subject 
to discipline (e.g., fined 
under the foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act) 
(?) 
(N) 
(S-) 
(-) 
(E-) 
(D) 
Key 
Board of Directors & Audit Committee Members (BD) 
Common Stock Investment Officers (Insurance) (CS) 
Certified Financial Analysts (CFA) 
Mutual Fund Analysts (MUT) 
Government Employees (GOV) 
Pilot Sample (PI) 
Commercial Lending Officers 
Certified Public Accountants 
Controllers for DJIA Companies 
Private Placement Investment Officers 
TOTAL SAMPLE (Mail) 
(CL) 
(CPAs) 
(MGMT) 
(PP) 
(T) 
Average 
Standard Deviation (μ) 
(δ) 
96.5 6 0 • .002* 
The client does not have an 
audit committee. EFFECT ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT: 
?** N s- - E- D μ 6 No Response 
BD 8.3 8.3 25 8.3 33.3 16.7 4.0 1.6 
CS 3.4 6.9 20.7 41.4 24.1 3.4 3.9 1.1 -
CFA - - 44.4 33.3 - 11.1 3.8 1.0 11.1 MUT - - - 50 25 25 4.8 .96 -GOV - - 50 25 25 - 3.8 .96 -
PI - 44.4 33.3 - 11.1 3.8 1.0 11.1 
CL _ 53.8 23.1 3.3 .48 23.1 
CPAs 14.3 35.7 28.6 21.4 - - 2.6 1.0 -MGMT - - 25 50 16.7 - 3.9 .7 8.3 
PP 2.9 5.7 22.9 40 25.7 2.9 3.9 1.1 -
T 3.8 7.6 28 34.1 18.2 4.5 3.7 1.13 3.8 
*χ 2 (chi-square) with its significance level is interpreted as the probability of observing the 
sample responses from the nine groups surveyed by mail given they a l l come from a population 
with homogeneous attitudes about internal control information. This χ2 statistic was computed 
based on frequency statistics, although percentages are presented here for ease-of interpretation. 
The degrees of freedom reflect the fact that BD had two subgroups: those directors who were 
audit committee members and those who were not. 
**Due to rounding, the percentages may sum to slightly more or less than 100. 
31 
2 
X -
Although a l l officers and 
employees take vacations, 
control duties and functions 
are not performed by other 
persons during their absence, 
i.e., work is delayed for the 
week. S-
Employees are not adequately 
bonded. 
76.2,60 @ .08 
BD 33.3 41.7 25 4.9 .79 
CS 6.9 13.8 20.7 44.8 13.8 - 3.5 1.12 -CFA - 11.1 22.2 33.3 22.2 - 3.8 1.04 11.1 MUT - - 25 25 50 - 4.3 .96 -GOV - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -
PI 7.7 46.2 23.1 23.1 - 3.6 .96 -
CL _ _ 7.7 53.8 7.7 4.0 .50 30.8 
CPAs 7.1 - 28.6 35.7 14.3 7.1 3.8 1.24 7.1 MGMT - 8.3 25.0 41.7 16.7 - 3.7 .91 8.3 PP 2.9 11.4 22.9 42.9 20.0 - 3.7 1.03 -T 3.0 7.6 18.9 41.7 20.5 3.0 3.8 1.06 5.3 
There is no internal auditor 
or audit staff. 
2 
χ = 133.260 @ .000 
? N S- - E- D μ δ No Response 
BD _ 8.3 8.3 16.7 41.7 25 4.7 1.2 -
CS - 3.4 6.9 44.8 41.4 3.4 4.4 .8 -CFA 11.1 - 33.3 44.4 - 4.3 1.0 11.1 MUT - 25 - 75 - - 3.5 1.0 -GOV - - 25 75 - 4.8 .5 -
PI 7.7 7.7 38.5 30.8 7.7 - 3.3 1.1 7.7 
CL _ _ 23.1 23.1 15.4 7.7 4.1 1.1 30.8 
CPAs 28.6 14.3 21.4 21.4 7.1 - 2.6 1.4 7.1 MGMT - 8.3 16.7 25.0 41.7 - 4.1 1.0 8.3 PP _ 2.9 14.3 34.3 45.7 2.9 4.3 .87 -T 3.0 6.1 12.1 32.6 36.4 4.5 4.1 1.1 5.3 
No authorization pro-
cedures exist for the 
purchase or sale of 
investments. 
X2 = 82.760 @ .03 
BD 8.3 8.3 25 41.7 16.7 4.5 1.17 
CS 3.4 3.4 6.9 37.9 48.3 - 4.2 .99 -CFA 11.1 - 11.1 11.1 44.4 11.1 4.3 1.6 11.1 MUT - - - 75 - 25 4.5 1.0 -GOV - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -
PI 7.7 7.7 38.5 46.2 - 4.2 .93 -
CL _ 15.4 38.5 15.4 4.0 .71 30.8 
CPAs 7.1 - 21.4 21.4 35.7 7.1 4.1 1.3 7.1 MGMT - - - 33.3 58.3 - 4.6 .51 8.3 PP 2.9 2.9 11.4 31.4 51.4 - 4.3 .98 -T 3.0 2.3 9.8 32.6 43.2 3.8 4.3 1.0 5.3 
32 
BD 8.3 8.3 25 33.3 25 4.6 1.24 
CS 3.4 13.8 27.6 27.6 27.6 - 3.6 1.15 -CFA - 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 - 3.5 1.2 11.1 MUT - - 25 25 50 - 4.3 .96 -GOV - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -
PI 7.7 53.8 30.8 7.7 - 3.4 .77 -
CL 7.7 46.2 15.4 . 3.1 .60 30.8 
CPAs 14.3 - 35.7 42.9 7.1 - 3.3 1.14 -MGMT 41.7 25.0 25.0 - 3.8 .87 8.3 PP 2.9 14.3 25.7 28.6 25.7 - 3.6 1.13 2.9 T 3.0 9.8 28.0 28.0 23.5 2.3 3.7 1.12 5.3 
2 
χ = 113.760 @ .0000 
N E- D μ δ No Response 
2 
X = 
The firm has no manual 
of operating procedures. 
2 X = 100 6 0 @ .0009 
? N s- E- D μ δ No Response 
BD 8.3 8.3 8.3 16.7 41.7 16.7 4.3 1.6 
CS 3.4 - 24.1 44.8 27.6 - 3.9 .9 -CFA 11.1 11.1 - 33.3 33.3 - 3.8 1.5 11.1 MUT - 25 25 25 25 - 3.5 1.3 -GOV - - - 75 25 - 4.3 .5 -
PI 7.7 46.2 15.4 30.8 - 3.7 1.0 -
CL _ 30.8 30.8 7.7 3.7 .7 30.8 
CPAs 21.4 - 28.6 35.7 14.3 - 3.2 1.4 -MGMT - - 25 33.3 33.3 - 4.1 .8 8.3 PP 2.9 - 22.9 40.0 34.3 - 4.0 .9 -T 5.3 2.3 21.2 37.1 28.0 1.5 3.9 1.1 4.5 
Access to computer 
facilities is not 
limited. 
χ2 - 72.9360 @ .12 
BD 16.7 8.3 58.3 16.7 4.4 1.68 
CS 3.4 3.4 17.2 48.3 27.6 - 3.9 .96 -CFA - 11.1 11.1 11.1 55.6 - 4.3 1.2 11.1 MUT - - - 50 50 - 4.5 .58 -GOV - - - - 100 - 5.0 0.0 -
PI 7.7 - 46.2 38.5 7.7 - 3.4 .96 -
CL 15.4 23.1 30.8 4.2 .83 30.8 
CPAs 7.1 - 7.1 28.6 42.9 7.1 4.3 1.25 7.1 MGMT - - 16.7 33.3 41.7 - 4.3 .79 8.3 PP 2.9 2.9 14.3 48.6 31.4 - 4.0 .92 -T 3.8 2.3 12.1 34.8 39.4 2.3 4.2 1.04 5.3 
A perpetual inventory system 
that continually records 
purchases and costs of sales 
throughout the year is not 
used; instead, the company 
uses a periodic system, up-
dating its inventory records 
once a year. 
dating its inventory records 
once a year. ? 
N S- - E- D u 6 No Response 
BO 8.3 25 25 33.3 8.3 3.2 1.3 
CS 3.4 10.3 27.6 34.5 24.1 - 3.7 1.1 -CFA 11.1 22.2 11.1 11.1 33.3 - 3.4 1.6 11.1 MUT 25 - - 50 25 - 3.5 1.7 -GOV - 50 25 25 - - 2.8 .96 -
PI 15.4 23.1 23.1 15.4 7.7 - 2.7 1.3 15.4 
CL 46.2 15.4 7.7 7.7 3.7 1.1 23.1 
CPAs 21.4 14.3 7.1 42.9 7.1 - 3.0 1.4 7.1 MGMT - 8.3 58.3 16.7 8.3 - 3.3 .79 8.3 PP 2.9 - 34.3 31.4 31.4 - 3.9 .96 -T 6.1 9.8 29.5 29.5 18.9 1.5 3.5 1.16 4.5 
χ2 = 95.560 @ .002 
All records maintained in 
the branches are under the 
supervision of the branch 
managers. 
2 
X = 81.760 @ .033 
BD 16.7 8.3 25.0 33.3 8.3 8.3 3.3 1.5 CS 13.8 27.6 24.1 13.8 17.2 - 2.9 1.3 3.4 CFA - 22.2 22.2 11.1 22.2 3.4 1.3 22.2 MUT - 25 - 75 - - 3.5 1.0 _ GOV 25 ..25 -50___ 3.0 1.4 
PI 38.5 38.5 15.4 7.7 - 2.9 .95 -
CL 7.7 23.1 30.8 _ 15.4 2.9 1.3 23.1 CPAs 21.4 14.3 7.1 50.0 7.1 - 3.1 1.4 _ MGMT - 25 33.3 25 8.3 - 3.2 .98 8.3 PP 5.7 11.4 31.4 20.0 28.6 - 3.6 1.21 2.9 T 9.8 18.2 25 23.5 16.7 .8 3.2 1.3 6.1 
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? I N I S- I - I E- I D I μ I δ No Response 
How would a management 
letter issued by an 
external auditor con-
taining a l l of the above 
internal control points χ
2 = 81.460 @ .03 
of management? *** ? N s- - E- D μ δ No Response 
BD 16.7 8.3 16.7 33.3 8.3 4.1 1.37 16.7 
CS 6.9 3.4 6.9 31.0 41.4 6.9 4.2 1.26 3.4 
CFA 11.1 22.2 - 22.2 22.2 11.1 3.6 1.8 11.1 MUT - - - 50 25 25 4.8 .96 -GOV - - - 25 50 25 5.0 .82 -
PI 23.1 23.1 30.8 15.4 - 3.4 1.08 7.7 
CL _ 23.1 23.1 30.8 - 4.1 .88 23.1 
CPAs 14.3 - 14.3 21.4 42.9 - 3.85 1.46 7.1 MGMT - - 16.7 25 50 8.3 4.5 .26 -PP 5.7 - 2.9 28.6 57.1 2.9 4.4 1.05 2.9 T 5.3 3.8 8.3 26.5 43.2 6.1 4.3 1.2 6.8 
How would a management 
letter containing a l l of 
the above internal control 
points affect your assess-
ment of management, i f you 
knew that each of the points 
were also noted in the manage-
ment letter issued last year? 
X 2 = 52.660 @ .74 
BD 8.3 16.7 8.3 33.3 16.7 4.4 1.4 16.7 
CS 3.4 6.9 6.9 17.2 48.3 17.2 4.5 1.3 -CFA 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 33.3 11.1 3.9 1.7 11.1 MUT - - - - 75 25 5.3 .5 -GOV 50 . 5 0 _ 
PI 23.1 7.7 15.4 53.8 4.0 1.29 -
CL _ 7.7 15.4 7.7 38.5 7.7 4.3 1.3 23.1 
CPAs 14.3 - 7.1 7.1 57.1 7.1 4.2 1.6 7.1 MGMT - - 8.3 8.3 58.3 25 5.0 .85 -PP 2.9 2.9 5.7 14.3 60.0 14.3 4.7 1.08 -T 3.8 4.5 8.3 11.4 50.8 15.9 4.6 1.24 S.3 
Would any of your responses 
change i f the company in-
volved was small (as opposed 
to a medium-sized or large 
company)? Yes No μ δ No Response 
BD 58.3 25 .70 .48 16.7 
CS 44.8 41.7 .46 .51 3.4 
CFA 11.1 55.6 .17 .41 33.3 
MUT 75 25 .75 .50 -GOV 100 - 1.0 0.0 -
PI 84.6 15.4 .85 .38 -
CL 53.8 30.8 .64 .51 15.4 
CPAs 71.4 14.3 .83 .39 14.3 
MGMT 58.3 33.3 .64 .51 8.3 
PP 42.9 48.6 .47 .51 8.6 
T 50.8 38.6 .57 .50 10.6 
2 
X = 20.312 @ .06 
***The respondents were not cons i s tent i n t h e i r responses i n the sense that some i n d i v i d u a l 
comments were deemed to have more of a negative e f f e c t on how management's evaluated than 
a l l of the comments combined. 
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It could even be worse for a smaller company that is not as financially 
sound and a mere marginal participant in an industry. (private place­
ment) 
The observed diversity in the interpretation of internal control points 
suggests that the report form of a management letter or a listing of material 
weaknesses alone is inadequate to provide a basis for evaluation of a company's 
management. In fact, several of the CPA respondents noted that it was 
impossible to evaluate the points without knowing more about the company and 
the context of the control suggestion, e.g., 
It is really impossible to answer these questions without some specific 
context. (CPAs) 
This requirement of more information is not as broadly recognized by other 
respondent groups. However, the evidence is clear that uniform interpretation 
of an internal control point will not occur. While uniform interpretation may not 
be desirable, if the basis of any interpretation is less than full understanding or 
knowledge, problems with such disclosures arise. 
The accounting literature states 
Informative disclosure to prudent investors presumes statement con­
tent which is explicit, complete, and unequivocal. (Griffin and Williams, 
1960, p. 46) 
The SEC advises 
A disclosure which makes the facts available in such form that their 
significance is apparent only upon searching analysis by experts does 
not meet the standards imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 as we 
understand that Act. (SEC, 1948, p. 133) 
The survey evidence on interpretations of internal control points suggests that 
neither of these standards for disclosure would be met by such a listing of 
material or immaterial weaknesses. The points listed in Table 2 demonstrate 
how not to communicate weaknesses in accounting controls. 
A Closer Look at the Disparity Between Users' and Producers' 
Responses 
If the CS, CFA, MUT, GOV, CL, and PP subgroups from Table 2 are 
combined as users of control disclosures and BD, CPAs, and Mgmt. are 
combined as producers of such disclosures, a test of the significance of the 
differences in responses between these two principal groups can be per­
formed. Such a comparison indicates that at a .05 level of significance: 
• the producer group considers the absence of adequate bonding to be 
much more negative than the user group (4.1 versus 3.7, where 1 = 
? and 6 = D from Table 2), 
• the user group considers the lack of an internal audit staff to be much 
more negative than the producer group (4.3 versus 3.8), 
• the user group considers the periodic inventory system to be less 
desirable (3.7 versus 3.1), and 
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• the producer group considers responses to be more dependent on the 
size of the company than the user group (.73 versus .51, where 1 = 
yes). 
For all other items in Table 2, the differences of opinion across the user and 
producer groups as to the effect of the control points on the evaluation of 
management are observed to be insignificant. 
Within the producer group, it is desirable to separately consider the BD 
group, since the audit committee members act not only as reviewers of 
external reporting issues on behalf of the company, but also act as users of 
internal control disclosures by CPAs. A review of Table 2 suggests that, in 
general, the BD group is harsher on management when reviewing the 
individual control points, other than the two points concerning periodic 
inventory and the maintenance of branch records. However, the combination of 
the control points or the repetition of control points across years is not 
evaluated as severely by the BD group as by other respondent groups. Some 
additional insight regarding these differences in opinion is gained by reviewing 
written comments received on the questionnaire instrument from BD re­
spondents. 
•RE: Periodic Inventory 
Depends on monetary size and quantity of inventory 
•RE: Branch's Records 
Not if properly audited 
•RE: Combined Points 
I don't see external auditors as experts in control. 
Depends on what the letter said. 
As we have those controls as a matter of course, the lack of them 
would have to cause a negative assessment of management—but 
it could be misleading. Management may be maximizing return to 
investors in terms of company growth and making efficient and 
profitable use of resources. 
•RE: Repetitive Points 
This case would still have to be judged on its merits. The 
company view is more meaningful than that of the auditor. 
Would have negative assessment if management was aware of 
these weaknesses but no attempt was made to correct them. 
Overall, it appears that the BD group, many of whom are audit committee 
members, are reasonably astute as to materiality considerations, substantive 
testing alternatives, the absence of cost/benefit analyses by CPAs, the 
importance of the context of internal control points, the central role of cost/ 
benefit evaluations, and the critical aspect of whether attempts have been 
made or plans formulated to respond to past years' control suggestions. How 
might control disclosures be structured to provide similar insight to other 
respondent groups? 
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Preference for Report Forms 
Some direction on how disclosures concerning accounting controls should 
be made can be provided from survey evidence that asks the stakeholder 
groups to rank possible report forms. However, when focusing on the 
preferences summarized in Table 3, it is necessary to qualify the results. 
Several respondents indicated in marginal comments a preference for no 
ranking, and in fact, no report on controls. It should also be noted that despite 
directions to use each rank number 1 through 8 once only, some respondents 
listed repeats, e.g., all 8's. The reason for emphasizing such comments and 
responses is to remind the reader that a preference of 1 does not constitute 
demand for internal control reporting; it simply represents that if reports are 
going to be made available, this is the preferred form. 
An evaluation of the underlying group responses indicates that commercial 
lending officers prefer an audit opinion with materiality limits more than other 
respondent groups; similarly, CPAs are most opposed to the auditor's report 
without materiality limitations. Mutual fund and commercial lending officers are 
proponents of the management letter provision while the Board of Director 
members, CPAs, and controllers are opposed to this form of report (again, 
relative to other respondents). Management is clearly a strong proponent of 
providing its opinion on controls to the public. If the groups were combined 
despite their significant differences, a general preference would be observed 
for a summary opinion on control systems by the auditor relative to a detailed 
listing of either controls or internal control points (the relative average rankings 
are 3.1, 5.2, and 4.3 respectively). This preference for fewer "details," as 
well as some question as to whether any such report should be made available, 
were further emphasized in written comments on this section of the question­
naire, as exemplified by the following quotes: 
None of these reports would be particularly useful to the public. In fact, 
they could be misleading in that the public might view them as an 
auditor's assurance that fraud cannot take place within the firm. 
Too much information is worse than not enough. (private placement) 
I cannot rate these. And do not wish to. Most stockholders and 
probably most investors would not read a report including so much 
additional and technical comment and could easily misinterpret them. 
(common stock investment officer) 
The whole concept of 'a report' is foolish and the concept of trying to 
synthesize the conditions prevailing in our 1,500 legal entities produces 
an exercise in madness. 
Please, SIRS, SUMMARIZE THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 
IN ONE SENTENCE. (Board of Directors and Audit Committee 
Member) 
These comments combined with those reported at the end of Table 3 suggest a 
general attitude that reports concerning internal controls should not be made 
available. The responses to the questions regarding the potential harm and 
perceived value of control reports reinforce this interpretation. 
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TABLE 3 
PREFERENCE FOR REPORT FORMS (A FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES) 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Listed below are eight possible report forms related to internal control which have been proposed for public dissemination. 
Please rank these in order of preference (1 = most preferred, 8 = least preferred); costs related to each report should 
be considered in your ranking. Use each of the rank numbers 1, 2, 8 one time only per column. The reporting alterna-
tives are listed in alphabetical order. 
Key 
Board of Directors 5 Audit Committee Members (BD) 
Common Stock Investment Officers (Insurance) (CS) 
Certified Financial Analysts (CFA) 
Mutual Fund Analysts (MUT) 
Government Employees (GOV) 
A. Auditor's opinion that a company's internal 
accounting control system adequately provides 
reasonable assurance that there is control 
over errors or irregularities that could be 
material to the financial statements. 
* χ2 (chi-square) with its significance level is interpreted as the probability of observing the sample responses from 
the nine groups surveyed by mail given they all come from a population with homogeneous attitudes about internal 
control information. Note that the underlying assumption of χ2 is independence and that these responses are expected 
to be intercorrelated due to the fact that they represent ranking statistics. Therefore, the mean values for the 8 
responses (A through H) for the 9 groups surveyed by mail were analyzed by calculating the Kendall Coefficient of 
Concordance. The results are reported below: 
W value .379 
χ2df value 23.8567 
Probability of exceeding this 
X2 value i f the null hypo-
thesis of independence is 
correct .001 
Kendall S--sums of squares 
of deviations from expected 
sums of ranks 1,278 
The conclusion is that significant differences do exist among the groups' rankings. As noted in Table 2, the 
reported χ2 statistics were generated from frequency data, although percentages are reported herein for ease 
of interpretation. The board of directors were again subdivided into two groups for the computation. 
**Due to rounding, the percentages may sum to slightly more or less than 100. 
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BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
PI 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
1** 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 μ δ No Response 
16.7 41 7 8.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 3.0 2.0 
37.9 10 3 6.9 17.2 10.3 6 9 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.4 
33.3 22 2 - - - - 11.1 2.5 2.7 33.3 
25 25 25 3.7 3.8 25 
- - 25 25 - 25 - - 4.3 1.1 25 
30.8 15.4 15.4 7.7 15.4 7 7 - - 2.8 1.8 7.7 
38.5 15 4 15.4 7.7 7.7 - - - 2.2 1.4 15.4 
- 14 3 21.4 21.4 7.1 7 1 14.3 4.3 2.1 14.3 
8.3 - 33.3 8.3 25.0 - - - 3.6 1.3 25.0 
40 14 3 5.7 11.4 11.4 2 9 5.7 - 2.7 2.0 8.6 
28.0 15 2 11.4 12.9 9.8 3 8 2.3 4.5 3.1 2.0 12.1 
X 2 = 92.28 4 @ .26* 
Pilot'Sample (PI) 
Commercial Lending Officers (CL) 
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) 
Controllers for DJIA Companies (MGMT) 
Private Placement Investment Officers (PP) 
TOTAL SAMPLE (Mail) (T) 
Average (μ) 
Standard Deviation (δ) 
BD 25 8. 3 25 8.3 16.7 16.7 3.7 2.5 
CS 6.9 20.7 17.2 27.6 6.9 10. 3 3.4 3.6 1.7 6.9 
CFA 22.2 22.2 11.1 - - - - 11.1 2.8 2.6 33. 3 
MUT 25 - - 25 25 - 4.3 2.1 25 
GOV 25 25 - - - 25 4.7 6.2 25 
PI 15.4 - 15.4 23.1 7.7 7.7 7.7 4.8 1.9 23.1 
CL 23.1 23.1 15.4 7.7 15.4 4.8 1.8 15.4 
CPAS - 14.3 14. 3 14.3 7.1 35.7 6.4 1.6 14.3 
MGMT - 16.7 33.3 8.3 16.7 5.6 1.5 25 
PP 2.9 17.1 25.7 17.1 8.6 14.3 - 2.9 3.8 1.6 11.4 
T 6.1 12.9 15.9 17.4 12.1 9.8 .8 11.4 4.2 2.0 13.6 
C. Description of the existing internal 
accounting controls by management 
(assume the length is constrained to 
five pages of an annual report). 
D. External Auditor's Letter of Recommendations 
(i.e., Management Letter). 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 No Response 
BD _ 8 3 8.3 8 3 25 8. 3 33 3 6.3 1.7 8.3 
CS 20. 7 10 3 20 7 6.9 6 9 10.3 10.3 6 9 3.8 2.4 6.9 
CFA 11.1 22 2 22.2 - - - 11 1 3.8 2.3 33.3 
MUT 25 25 - 25 - - - - 2.3 1.5 25 
GOV 25 - - 50 - - 5.0 1.9 25 
PI 23.1 15 4 15 4 15.4 15.4 - - 15 4 3.6 2.4 -
CL 15.4 23 1 30 8 - - - 7.7 7 7 3.2 2.3 15.4 
CPAs - 21 4 - - 42.9 - 21 4 5.8 1.9 14.3 
MGMT 8 3 - 25.0 - 25.0 - 16 7 5.3 2.0 25.0 
PP 20 14 3 14 3 11.4 8 6 5.7 11.4 5 7 3.7 2.3 8.6 
T 12.9 9 8 16 7 9.8 4 5 14.4 6.8 11 4 4.3 2.3 13.6 
E. Listing of primary strengths and weaknesses 
of the internal accounting control system 
by the auditor (assume the length is con-
strained to five pages of an annual report). 
BD 16.7 16.7 33.3 33.3 6.8 1.1 _ 
CS 3.4 20.7 10.3 3.4 10.3 24.1 13.8 6.9 4.7 2.2 6.9 
CFA 11.1 - 11.1 11.1 22.2 - - 11.1 4.3 2.3 33. 3 
MUT - 25 25 - - - - 25 4.3 3.2 25 GOV - - - 25 - - 25 25 6.3 3.3 25 
PI - 7.7 7.7 7.7j 23.1 30.8 7.7 6.0 1.5 15.4 
CL 7.7 7.7 15.4 7.7 15.4 15.4 15.4 - 4.5 2.0 15.4 CPAs - - - 14.3 28.6 7.1 14.3 21.4 6.0 .4 14.3 
MGMT - - 8.3 - 8.3 16.7 16.7 25.0 6.4 1.7 25.0 PP 2.9 25.7 11.4 5.7 8.6 17.1 14.3 5.7 4.4 2.2 8.6 
T 3.0 12.9 9.1 6.1 12.9 15.2 15.2 12.9 5.1 2.1 12.9 
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B. Auditor's opinion that a company's internal 
accounting control system adequately provides 
reasonable assurances of achievement of each 
of the objectives of internal accounting control 
(i.e., cost-benefit considerations are not  
limited to amounts material to the financial  
statements). 
χ2 = 73.68 4 @ .79 
X2 = 85.98 4 @ .43 
X 2 = 78.684 @ .65 
X 2 - 98.7 8 4 @ .13 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I s 6 7 8 μ δ No Response 
BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
6.9 
22.2 
7.1 
8.3 
8.6 
6.8 
13.8 
25 
14.3 
8.3 
8.6 
8.3 
8.3 
6.9 
25 
7.1 
11.4 
6.8 
8.3 
13.8 
11.1 
7.7 
7.7 
14. 3 
8.3 
5.7 
9.1 
20.7 
11.1 
23.1 
7.1 
28.6 
15.9 
16.7 
25 
23.1 
15.4 
8.3 
5.7 
6.1 
25 
10.3 
11.1 
25 
25 
15.4 
7.7 
21.4 
33. 3 
8.6 
15.2 
41.7 
24.1 
11.1 
25 
38.5 
30.8 
14.3 
8. 3 
14.3 
19.7 
6.7 
5.0 
4.3 
5.3 
5.7 
6.9 
6.4 
4.8 
5.4 
4.8 
5.2 
1.7 
2.4 
2.9 
2.1 
6.9 
1.3 
1.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.2 
2.3 
3.4 
33.3 
25 
25 
15.4 
15.4 
14.3 
25.0 
8.6 
12.1 
χ2 = 143.884 @ .0000 
F. Management's opinion on the adequacy of the 
internal accounting control system. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 No Response 
BP 25 16.7 8.3 _ 25.0 8.3 16.7 3.9 2.6 . 
CS 6.9 - 3.4 3.4 13.8 3.4 10.3 51.7 6.5 2.2 6.9 
CFA 11.1 - - 22.2 33.3 6.2 2.7 33.3 
MUT 25 - - 50 6.7 2.3 25 
GOV 25 - - 50 - - - 3.7 4.1 25 
PI 23.1 7.7 7.7 15.4 - - 23.1 7.7 4.1 2.7 15.4 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
7.7 
50 
50 
15.9 
7.1 
33.3 
5.3 
14. 3 
8.3 
2.9 
4.5 
15.4 
11.4 
6.1 
7.7 
7.1 
11.4 
11.4 
15.4 
5.7 
6.1 
15.4 
8.6 
6.1 
23.1 
7.1 
51.4 
33.3 
5.8 
2.3 
1.6 
6.8 
5.3 
2.2 
2.2 
.7 
1.7 
2. 7 
15.4 
14.3 
8.3 
8.6 
11.4 
G. Management's opinion, attested to by an 
independent auditor, that a company's 
internal accounting control system 
adequately provides reasonable assurance 
that there is control over errors or 
irregularities that could be material to 
the financial statements. 
BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
PI 
CL 
CPAs 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
χ2 = 77.3 8 4 @ .69 
BD 16.7 25 25 8.3 8.3 16.7 4.3 2.4 
CS 17.2 - 6.9 13.8 6.9 13.8 31 3.4 4.9 2.3 6.9 
CFA 11.1 11.1 - - - 22.2 - 22.2 5.2 3.0 33. 3 
MUT 25 - - - 25 25 - - 4.0 2.6 25 
GOV 25 25 - - - 25 - 3.3 6.9 25 
PI 7.7 7.7 23.1 15.4 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 4.2 2.1 15.4 
CL 7. 7 - 7.7 7.7 7.7 15.4 30.8 7.7 5.5 2.1 15.4 
CPAs 7.1 7.1 14.3 7.1 7. 1 - 35.7 7.1 5.1 2.4 14.3 
MGMT 8.3 - 8.3 8.3 8.3 16.7 8.3 16.7 5.3 2.3 25.0 
PP 11.4 2.9 8.6 17.1 2.9 14.3 28.6 8.6 5.1 2.3 5.7 
T 12.9 3.0 9.1 12.1 5.3 12.9 23.5 9.1 5.0 2.3 12.1 
21. If you could select some 
combination of the above 
report forms, you would 
prefer*** 
χ2 = 4 7 6 - 2 480 @ .54 
BD 
CS 
CFA 
MUT 
GOV 
PI 
CL 
CPAS 
MGMT 
PP 
T 
25 
51.7 
44.4 
25 
25 
38.5 
30.8 
14.3 
16.7 
54.3 
38.6 
***Percentages indicate how many respondents mentioned a given report within the combination listed on the 
questionnaire; since a number of combinations were indicated, the sum of the percentages is not equal 
to 100%. 
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H. Management's opinion, attested to by an 
independent auditor, that a company's 
internal accounting control system 
adequately provides reasonable assurances 
of achievement of each of the objectives 
of internal accounting control (i.e., 
cost-benefit considerations are not  
limited to amounts material to the  
financial statements). 1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 u 6 No Response 
χ2 = 68.6 7 2 @ .60 
16.7 
3.4 
22.2 
25 
25 
23.1 
15.4 
21.4 
16.7 
5.7 
12.1 
33.3 
13.8 
30.8 
30.8 
35.7 
25.0 
14.3 
18.9 
8.3 
17.2 
25 
23.1 
7.7 
7.1 
16.7 
20.0 
13.6 
8.3 
10.3 
7.7 
7.7 
7.1 
8.3 
11.4 
8.3 
16.7 
13.8 
11.1 
25 
25 
7.7 
15.4 
7.1 
8.6 
11.4 
8.3 
24.1 
7.7 
14.3 
22.9 
14.4 
8.3 
10.3 
33.3 
25 
8.3 
11.4 
9.8 
3.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.3 
3.0 
2.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.8 
4.2 
3.8 
2.0 
1.8 
2.9 
3.1 
2.7 
1.2 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
1.9 
2.0 
6.9 
33.3 
25 
25 
7.7 
15.4 
7.1 
25 
5.7 
11.4 
25 
34.5 
33.3 
25 
30.8 
15.4 
7.1 
8. 3 
31.4 
24.2 
8.3 
37.9 
22.2 
25 
30.8 
7.1 
8. 3 
48.6 
28.8 
44.8 
22.2 
25 
3875 
7.1 
40.0 
27.3 
8.3 
24.1 
22.2 
50 
7.7 
7.1 
28.6 
18.2 
16. 7 
6.9 
25 
38.5 
15.4 
21.4 
25 
5.7 
11.4 
25 
6.9 
22.2 
25 
23.1 
23.1 
7.1 
8.3 
8.6 
12.1 
25 
6.9 
11.1 
25 
5.7 
6.8 
A B C D E F G H 
22. Would you consider public 
dissemination of any of the x 2 = 4 6 7 . 7 3 6 0 @ . 0 0 0 1 
above report forms to be: 
Of l i t t l e or no value? 
A B C D E F G H 
BD 8. 3 8.3 66.7 33.3 41.7 33.3 16.7 25 
CS 10.3 10.3 31.0 17.2 24.1 37.9 17.2 31 
CFA 22.2 22.2 33.3 33.3 11.1 33.3 22.2 22.2 
MUT 25 25 25 - 25 25 25 -
GOV - 25 25 - 25 - - -
PI 23.1 
38.5 
61.5 38.5 76.9 46.2 46.2 38.5 
CL 23.1 30.8 46.2 46.2 38.5 53.8 30.8 38.5 
CPAS 35.7 35.7 71.4 57.1 64. 3 28.6 35.7 50 
MGMT 41.7 58.3 83.3 50.0 83.3 33.3 41.7 58.3 
PP 11.4 11.4 37.1 17.1 20 45.7 25.7 34. 3 
T 18.2 21.2 46.2 28.8 34.8 37.9 25 34.1 
Harmful ? χ2 = 329.8 2 4 0 @ .0001 
BD 8.3 8.3 41.7 33. 3 8. 3 
CS 6.9 3.4 3.4 27.6 24.1 3.4 6.9 6.9 
CFA 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 33.3 22.2 22.2 
MUT - - 25 25 25 - - -
GOV - - 25 25 - - - -
PI 30.8 38.5 23.1 46.2 30.8 23.1 23.1 30.8 
CL 15.4 15.4 7.7 23.1 38.5 15.4 23.1 23.1 
CPAS 28.6 42.9 35.7 50 57.1 28.6 28.6 42.9 
MGMT - - 8. 3 8.3 16.7 - - -
PP 8.6 5.7 8.6 31.4 28.6 8.6 11.4 11.4 
T 9.8 10.6 12.1 29.5 29.5 9.8 11.4 13.6 
Is there some other report form not l isted that 
you would prefer to the above alternative? 
Board of Directors 
& 
The SEC's insistence on more reports w i l l tend to dilute more 
important information in annual reports. 
Audit Committee Members The auditor's certificate is a l l the reassurance needed. 
Common Stock Investment 
Officers (Insurance) 
A management statement l i s t ing uncorrected management letter 
comments. 
Pilot Sample N/A: Question was not included on pilot survey instrument. 
Commercial Lending Officers No report should be offered. 
Certified Public Accountants SEC proposal for Phase I only. 
Controllers for DJIA Companies Compliance is a matter of law under FCPA. 
In our view no additional reports should be required. 
Private Placement Investment Officers Some standard established by accounting profession. 
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With respect to potential harm, several respondents stated that such 
disclosures would be 
Dangerous to make . . . public due to (their) proprietary nature. 
(private placement) 
Hence, some general consensus that internal control reports are not desired is 
reflected by marginal comments, and if such reports are made available, the 
respondents clearly do not prefer the most extensive or most expensive report 
forms. In general, for the total sample, the auditor's report on internal 
controls, perhaps accompanied by management's opinion, limited to materiality 
considerations, is the preferred report form if control reporting is required. 
A Second Look at the Disparity Between Users' and Producers' 
Responses 
When the same user/producer dichotomy described for Table 2 is applied to 
Table 3, the following significant differences (at a .05 level) are observed: 
• the user group prefers reports 
A (2.8 versus 3.6), 
B (3.8 versus 5.1), 
C (3.7 versus 5.8), and 
D (4.6 versus 6.4) 
relative to the producer group and 
• the producer group prefers reports 
F (2.6 versus 6.4) and 
G (3.0 versus 4.1) 
relative to the user group. 
Obviously these difference statistics are not strictly appropriate for the data, 
given they are intercorrelated rankings, but they do provide insight as to which 
reports influence the overall significance of the Kendall Coefficient of Concor­
dance, reported in Table 3. 
Of particular interest, as suggested earlier, are the responses of the BD 
group, a continuing user of internal control disclosures by CPAs. As reported 
in Table 3, the BD group ranks public disclosure of either the external auditor's 
letter of recommendations (report D) or a listing of strengths and weaknesses 
in the internal accounting control system by the auditor (report E) extremely 
low relative to the other respondents (6.3 and 6.8 respectively, versus an 
overall mean for the total sample, including BD, of 4.3 and 5.1). It would 
appear that as frequent users of management letters, the BD members would 
oppose making such reports public. As reflected in the comments already 
cited, the BD group, as well as the other respondents, generally opposed the 
concept of such potentially long and complicated disclosures. A comment by 
one BD respondent reflects the overall message: 
The auditor's certificate is all the reassurance needed. 
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The Effect of Prior Beliefs on Observed Attitudes Related to Inter-
nal Accounting Control 
The survey instrument was constructed to provide a means of gaining some 
understanding of the extent to which the survey responses are affected by the 
• misunderstanding of current audit responsibilities, 
• lack of awareness that internal control adequacy does not preclude 
fraud, and 
• tendency of respondents not to consider cost factors in such policy 
issues. 
This study utilizes an "attitude-behavioral intention" framework (see Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975 for a detailed theoretical discussion). Prior beliefs about 
internal accounting control systems or extended reporting responsibilities and 
their related costs are assessed as a basis for explaining the attitudes of 
respondents regarding 
• the desirability of extending internal accounting control reporting 
responsibilities, 
• internal accounting control report preference rankings, and 
• the effect of internal accounting control points, reported in an 
auditor's management letter, on the evaluation of the degree to which 
management is fulfilling its responsibilities to stockholders and credi­
tors. 
The results are reported in Exhibit A of the Appendix. 
Exhibit A first outlines the operational questions used to assess beliefs 
regarding auditors' present responsibilities with respect to internal control, 
limitations of internal control and audit procedures, the state of the art with 
respect to evaluating controls and management's implementation of controls, 
and the expected costs of expanded study and evaluation of controls. The belief 
codes are then related to respondents' attitudes regarding the desirability of 
auditors' involvement, preference for internal control report forms, and the 
evaluation of internal control points in management letters. 
The key findings, as reported in Exhibit A include the following: 
• respondents' beliefs regarding auditors' present responsibilities ex­
plain a substantial amount of the observed variation in opinions 
concerning 
—whether management's opinion on the adequacy of the internal 
accounting control system is preferred (72%), 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that employees 
are not adequately bonded would have an effect on how manage­
ment is assessed (56%), and 
—whether one's responses regarding the effect of internal control 
points on the assessment of management would change if the 
company involved was small (as opposed to a medium-sized or large 
company) (64%); 
• respondents' beliefs regarding the limitations of internal control and 
audit procedures explain a substantial amount of the observed 
variation in opinions concerning 
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—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client 
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (54%), 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that all of the 
current year's comments were also noted in the management letter 
issued last year (60%), and 
—whether one's responses regarding the effect of internal control 
points on the assessment of management would change if the 
company involved was small (as opposed to a medium-sized or large 
company) (61%); 
• respondents' beliefs regarding the state of the art with respect to 
evaluating controls and management's implementation of controls 
explain a substantial amount of the observed variation in opinion 
concerning 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client 
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (40%), 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that although all 
officers and employees take vacations, control duties and functions 
are not performed by other persons during their absence, i.e., 
work is delayed for the week, would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (44%), and 
—whether a management letter containing all of the management 
letter points cited would affect the assessment of management 
(39%); 
• respondents' beliefs regarding the expected costs of expanded study 
and evaluation of controls explain a substantial amount of the 
observed variation in opinion concerning 
—the desirability of auditors' involvement in the evaluation of internal 
controls (32% due to expected costs; 17% due to the expectation 
that fraud would be deterred; 31% due to the expectation that the 
public will be misled) and 
—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client 
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how 
management is assessed (16% due to expected costs; and 20% due 
to the expectation that the public will be misled). 
The implication which can be drawn from interpreting the main effects in the 
analysis of variance models that are reported in Exhibit A is that the profession 
can influence the various respondent groups' attitudes on control-related 
reporting issues by providing public information that will have an effect on 
these individuals' beliefs regarding the auditor's current activities, inherent 
limitations in control systems, available technology, and the costs of expanding 
both auditors' responsibilities and disclosure requirements. The information 
responsibilities of the profession are substantial, and "miscommunication," 
particularly as to auditors' current activities, can be expected to influence 
attitudes on disclosure issues. 
"Misinformation" About Internal Control in Management Reports 
One potential source of "misinformation" on auditors' responsibilities is 
the management report. The profession should, in light of the evidence 
presented in Exhibit A, exercise considerable care in reviewing management's 
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disclosures to ensure that auditors' activities, as well as the limitations of 
control systems and the cost considerations in establishing such systems, are 
accurately represented. 
Management reports were suggested by The Committee on Auditors' 
Responsibilities (1978, p. 76), and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants' Special Advisory Committee issued "Tentative Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Reports by Management," providing examples of 
wording.2 However, no standard language is presented; per discussion with an 
AICPA representative, the Committee wanted to avoid a letter format that 
would result in "boilerplate" application. However, as demonstrated in the 
following content analysis of management reports that are being issued, there 
are hazards of not prescribing a standard report. 
A Growing Concern 
Increased concern over the problems of imprecise language in manage­
ment's reports is warranted in light of the growing number of companies 
including such representations in their financial statements; Business Week 
reported in its April 16, 1978 issue that 
a surprising 38% of the (annual) reports (reviewed) carried such a note 
(companies acknowledging management's responsibility for developing 
the financial figures) compared with only four companies a year ago. 
This number has grown in apparent response to the Financial Executives 
Institute's (1978) endorsement that a management report be furnished in 
annual reports to shareholders. Beresford et al (1980) report from a sample of 
305 companies drawn from the Fortune top 1000 companies, 40% issued 
management reports in 1979 relative to 23% in 1978. Similarly, Price 
Waterhouse & Co. reports that 56% of a sample of large electric, gas, and 
water companies issued 1980 management reports, compared to 39% in 1979 
(Smartt, 1981). 
If the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposal to require a 
Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control (1979), postponed 
by the SEC in its June 6, 1980 withdrawal, were to be implemented, the scope 
of the problem with "misinformation" about internal controls would increase. 
Loose language concerning auditors' responsibilities could not only persist in 
management reports, but could be carried over to statements by management 
on internal accounting control. 
Such imprecision could have liability implications for both companies and 
auditors (particularly with respect to "perceived" attestations of compliance 
with the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(b)(2)]. In past litigation, auditors' internal 
control work has been liberally interpreted in its scope. 
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law and 
statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First Securities' internal 
control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to 
prepare for filing with the Commission the annual report of its financial 
condition required under Section _ 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 17a-5, 
17 CFR _ 240.17a-5. 
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While responsibilities for Securities brokers or dealers include a review of 
internal controls according to audit procedures prescribed by the jurisdictional 
agency, such statements of expanded scope are not recommended to be 
included in reports to the public (Committee on Auditing Procedure, "Audits of 
Brokers or Dealers in Securities"). The above quote from Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder extends the review responsibility to include the auditor/customer 
relationship, in spite of potential problems with the customer's knowledge of 
the nature of the review conducted, or understanding of its limitations. 
In the Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. case (1976, 195, 683), Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. faced the claim3 (among others) that the proxy 
statements were deficient for 
failure to disclose that Chadbourn (a company with whom Standard 
merged) had continuing serious deficiencies in its data processing 
systems that jeopardized its business future and cast substantial doubt 
upon internally generated business statistics. 
It is clear that the courts are contesting the limited evaluation and reporting 
responsibilities of auditors regarding internal controls. The common issuance 
of management reports that claim an extended audit function is likely to provide 
added impetus to litigation disputes. 
An additional ramification of "misinformation" is its potential effect on 
individuals' decision-making. If creditors and investors believe the attest 
function extends to internal controls, they may not assess the risk profile of 
individual companies properly. This implies misallocations of resources and 
wealth transfers which would not occur in the absence of such erroneous 
beliefs. 
Methodology 
From the population of annual reports on file at the Graduate School of 
Management Library, at the University of Rochester, the latest available 
report for 88 of the 1980 top Fortune 100 companies was examined and a 
sample of 49 management reports was identified. Exhibit B of the Appendix 
summarizes the results of the content analysis which was performed for six of 
the companies providing management reports. Similar information for the other 
43 companies can be obtained by contacting the author, who is now at Southern 
Methodist University. Exhibit C of the Appendix lists those "latest" annual 
reports reviewed for the sample that contained no management report, as well 
as those 12 companies of the Fortune 100 for which no annual report was 
available. 
Results 
Although Exhibit B indicates that many of the management reports contain 
similar content and tend to concern the topics generally described in the 
literature, "misinformation" is present in many of the reports regarding 
• the requirements of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), 
and 
• the nature of internal control. 
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Under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) an auditor is 
permitted to make an economic choice between reliance on internal controls or 
non-reliance. If the auditor believes a more effective and efficient audit can be 
performed without testing the control system, or if the system has such 
significant weaknesses that reliance is unwarranted, the auditor may only 
perform substantive tests. 
In addition, GAAS apply to internal accounting controls as distinct from 
internal controls. Operating controls like quality of production checks are not 
subject to the auditor's review. In addition, only administrative controls that 
directly affect the accounts are required to be considered in the normal course 
of an audit. This emphasis on internal accounting controls is a very small subset 
of a firm's internal controls, i.e., the nervous system that activates overall 
operating policies and keeps a business within practical performance ranges. 
Furthermore, any reference to an auditor's review of such elements as 
"timeliness of disclosure" suggests an efficiency orientation to an audit which 
misrepresents the general nature of the audit function. Other than meeting 
regulators' time limits, there will be no specific attention paid to whether 
production reports or other disclosures are prepared in a timely manner. 
Not only do Generally Accepted Auditing Standards not require a compre­
hensive review of an entire system of internal accounting controls, they do not 
provide a basis for reporting on the adequacy of internal accounting controls 
(let alone internal controls). Communication of material weaknesses in internal 
accounting control that come to an auditor's attention during an examination of 
financial statements is required. 
However there is no requirement under generally accepted auditing 
standards to evaluate each control or to identify every material 
weakness. (Statement on Auditing Standards No. 20, ¶3). 
In addition, the criterion applied by an auditor to identify a material weakness is 
whether reasonable assurance is provided that "errors or irregularities in 
amounts that would be material in the financial statements being audited would 
be prevented or detected within a timely period by employees in the normal 
course of performing their assigned activities." (Statement on Auditing 
Standard No. 1). These criteria may be broader than those that may be 
appropriate for evaluating weaknesses in accounting control for management or 
other purposes. 
Auditors differ as to their policies regarding the recommendation of internal 
control modifications and improvements. There is no requirement that they 
make such recommendations, and when the suggestions are verbalized, they 
are not analyzed on a cost/benefit basis to determine the propriety of the 
changes. The frequent absence of comprehensive internal control review and 
written control suggestions by auditors and the responsibility of management 
to select a control system based on cost/benefit estimates suggest that regular 
duties of auditors are being exaggerated and the management decision process 
for selection of controls is not being appropriately communicated in representa­
tions by managers. 
"The work of internal auditors cannot be substituted for the work of the 
independent auditor" (Statement on Auditing Standard No. 9). While internal 
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auditors' procedures affect the nature, timing, and extent of the independent 
auditor's work, such internal audit functions are a supplement to, not a 
substitute for, the work of the independent auditor. The independent auditor 
will duplicate the efforts of internal auditors in the sense that tests of some of 
the work of internal auditors will be performed. Obviously, if significant 
defalcations by management occurred, there could be an incentive for internal 
auditors to concentrate their "work" in that area in an attempt to deter the 
external auditor from testing that area of control and/or set of transactions. 
While an independent auditor does not expect or search for fraud, the 
independence issue precludes clear substitution of internal audit work in an 
examination by an external auditor. 
Exhibit B illustrates phraseology that could be misleading to report users in 
understanding GAAS. Confusion already exists with respect to auditor respon­
sibility for the detection of fraud, as reported in survey results by Professor 
Richard E. Ziegler. Ziegler reports that bankers, financial analysts, and 
individual shareholders agree 
That an examination made in accordance with GAAS means that the 
auditor conforms to GAAS; evaluates the adequacy of the accounting 
system; (and) uses procedures specifically intended to detect fraud or 
other irregularities (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 
1977, pp. 174-175). 
Furthermore, the nature of internal control, particularly its limitations, is not 
adequately discussed in most management reports. An analysis by a re­
searcher at the AICPA concerns problems with discussions of internal 
controls, other than the auditor's role, in fifty-eight management reports (56 
from 1977 annual reports and 2 from 1978 reports). Zuber (1978) found only 
five of the fifty-eight reports referred to "internal accounting control" as 
opposed to internal control or financial control. Only nine of the fifty-eight 
reports discussed cost/benefit considerations and even fewer (five) referred to 
"inherent limitations" of internal accounting control. Other evidence accumu­
lated by Zuber on the elements contained in the internal control references 
found in annual reports clearly demonstrates "misinformation" on current 
design and implementation practices and the general nature of internal control 
systems. While the results of my own study demonstrate some improvement 
relative to Zuber's findings, "misinformation" is still apparent. A key problem 
is that discussions of the adequacy of internal accounting controls are 
frequently loosely coupled with descriptions of independent auditors' activities. 
While much literature has discussed the frequency of management reports and 
their general content (see, for example, Brown and Kintzele, 1980 and 
Financial Analysts Journal, 1980), to my knowledge, other than the Zuber 
(1978) research cited above, little attention has been given to the detailed 
disclosures that can "miscommunicate." 
Implications for Disclosure 
The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 and Exhibits A and B has several 
implications for the auditor: 
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• Although SAS No. 30 permits disclosure of both material and 
immaterial weaknesses in public reports that express the auditor's 
opinion of internal accounting control as of a specified time period, the 
auditor should refrain from short listings of internal control points 
such as those summarized in Table 2 
—to avoid misinterpretation, 
—to avoid disclosing proprietary information, and 
—besides, users appear to prefer an opinion, in contrast to detailed 
information. 
• While SAS No. 30 specifies that reports on an entity's system based 
solely on a study and evaluation of internal accounting control made as 
part of an audit is intended for "restricted use," such use includes 
"other specified third parties"; since it is probable such parties will 
include some of the stakeholder groups sampled in this study, a mere 
listing of control points could cause problems similar to those typically 
anticipated for reports on which no restrictions are placed on use. 
• If a description of a control weakness is required, such description 
must explicitly describe the risk exposure from such a weakness; 
otherwise users will draw their own inferences concerning risk, some 
of which are likely to overstate or understate the actual risk faced by 
the entity. 
• When conferring with a client who is preparing a management report 
on controls, the auditor should make management aware of the 
observed diversity of interpretation of such disclosures and the 
possibility of disclosing proprietary information, as well as the 
importance of accurately describing the auditors' limited involvement 
with internal accounting controls and the inherent limitations and cost/ 
benefit dimensions of a control system. 
• When requested to provide services related to the evaluation of 
controls, the CPA can discuss the reported preferences for control 
disclosures, and thereby assist the client in selecting the preferred 
type of engagement. 
• When asked to advise a client as to whether resources should be 
allocated to a report on internal accounting controls, the general lack 
of interest in such reports indicated in this study can be discussed, as 
can the regulatory threat by the SEC of requiring such reports in the 
absence of voluntary disclosure; presumably, a cost/benefit analysis 
could then be performed by the entity as to its preferred disclosure 
strategy. 
To meet desired standards of disclosure, Table 2 with the reported 
diversity of interpretation demonstrates how not to disclose weaknesses; 
additional direction to the profession beyond SAS 30 as to the form of 
disclosure which would at least narrow the range of the perceived effects of a 
particular weakness would be useful in avoiding possible ill effects of experi­
menting with control disclosures. Furthermore, Exhibit B suggests some 
potentially misleading disclosures in management reports which warrant 
attention by the profession. 
My analysis presented in Exhibit A of the Appendix suggests one approach 
to improving the consistency with which existing disclosures and future 
proposals for additional disclosures, particularly those related to internal 
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accounting controls, are evaluated by market participants. By informing the 
public as to the state of the art of audit technology, the requirements of GAAS, 
the current responsibilities of CPAs, and the verifiable costs of proposed 
requirements, market participants' beliefs on such matters will be more 
consistent with observed auditing practices, and, in turn, their attitudes 
involving disclosure policies can be expected to be less diverse than would be 
the case if erroneous beliefs as to auditing practices were permitted to persist. 
Footnotes 
1. A wave analysis comparing early and late respondents, as well as a paired-sample t-test of 
original responses with those received from a post-questionnaire study were performed as tests 
for nonresponse bias. No significant differences were observed. 
2. Beresford et al (1980) provide a useful comparison of the subjects which have been proposed 
for inclusion in management reports by the Financial Executives Institute, the Cohen Commission, 
and the AICPA. 
3. While this case was appealed and decided in favor of the accountant, as was the Hochfelder 
case, the mere claim in past litigation that auditors be held responsible for assessing the adequacy 
of internal controls suggests that litigious concerns are warranted. 
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EXHIBIT A 
ANOVA Results Concerning the Relationship of Beliefs and Attitudes Related to Internal Accounting Control 
•Auditors' Present Responsibilities 
This series of statements is 
designed to determine your views 
about the nature of internal 
accounting control and its 
current relationship to the 
external audit function. For 
each item, please answer by 
circling one of the following 
categories: 
Definitely True (DT) 
More True than False (MTF) 
Uncertain (?) 
More False than True (MFT) 
Definitely False (DF) 
BELIEFS 
Operational Questions 
Al l internal accounting controls that have a significant bearing on the prevention and 
detection of material fraud are tested by the external auditor annually. 
The auditor's unqualified audit report implicitly indicates that no material weakness 
exists in the internal accounting controls of the client. 
The determination of whether or not recommended internal accounting controls are 
justified on a cost/benefit basis is the responsibility of the auditor. 
Special examinations specifically designed to detect defalcations will uncover a l l 
current defalcations. 
If a financial statement item can be substantiated with less effort by not relying on 
internal accounting control, the auditor may omit testing of the related control 
B 
C 
D 
E 
•Limitations of Internal Control 
and Audit Procedures 
[Same Directions As Above] 
If a current internal accounting control system is deemed adequate, it is reasonable 
to project the future adequacy of such controls. 
Most embezzlement losses are due to lack of compliance with prescribed procedures or 
circumvention of the internal accounting control system, rather then the ineffective-
ness of the system design. 
Internal accounting control systems border on impotence when standing guard against 
collusion of management. 
A fraud such as occurred at Equity Funding is possible without the auditor being at 
fault. 
[Also applicable.] 
BB 
CC 
DD 
EE 
•State of the Art 
[Same Directions As Above] 
The evaluation of internal accounting controls is a highly subjective process in which 
knowledgeable individuals can arrive at different conclusions concerning adequacy. 
Weaknesses in internal accounting control will cause unaudited financial statements to 
be misleading. 
Management should accept and implement recommendations by the auditor for improvements 
in the internal accounting control system. 
AAA 
BBB 
CCC 
•Expected Costs of Expanded Study 
and Evaluation of Controls 
Below is a l ist of possible 
effects of extending auditors' 
internal control responsibili-
ties. Please indicate whether 
effect of extended responsibi-
l i t ies . (Yes or No) 
-Cost Effects 
-Financial Statement Effect 
-Fraud Deterrent Expected 
-Less Information 
-Misled Public 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF EXTENDING AUDITORS' INTERNAL CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES 
Audit costs will increase by 30%. 
Companies on average will increase the investment in their internal accounting control 
systems in excess of the level of investment that can be justified on a cost/benefit 
The increased controls will be cumbersome, resulting in lower efficiency of operations. 
The internal accounting controls are extended beyond the firm's cost/benefit point in 
order to cover the l iabi l i ty risk to directors and external auditors. 
Public disclosure of internal accounting control information (e.g., material weaknesses) 
will create a competitive disadvantage to the reporting companies. 
The risk of error in year-end financial statement balances will increase. 
Substantially greater protection against material fraud is not provided. 
Information items currently in annual reports, e.g., accident records, hiring and manage-
ment training programs, will be deleted, i . e . , replaced by a "boiler-plate" report. 
Managers will be unwilling to respond to analysts' direct questions concerning internal 
control; the analysts wil l simply be referred to the public "boiler-plate" reports. 
The extension and related disclosures will mislead the public. 
Users of internal accounting control reports will project over the long-term future that 
such controls will be adequate. 
Users of internal accounting control reports believe fraud is thereby precluded. 
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EXHIBIT C 
No Management Report Included in Annual Report Reviewed 
Company Year Auditor 
All ied Chemical 
American Can Co. 
American Home Products Corp. 
Atlantic Richfield 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1976 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Boeing 
Borden, Inc. 
1973 
1979 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Caterpillar 
Champion International Corporation 
The Charter Co. 
Chrysler Corp. 
The Coastal Corporation 
Consolidated Foods Corp. 
CPC International 
1978 
1977 
1980 
1978 
1980 
1975 
1977 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Main Lafrentz & Co. 
Deere & Co. 
Dow Chemical Co. 
1979 
1973 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Esmark 
Exxon 
1981 
1979 
Arthur Young & Co. 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Farmland Industries 1981 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
General Dynamics 
The Greyhound Corp. 
Gulf 4 Western Industries, Inc. 
1977 
1976 
1974 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Ernst & Ernst 
International Paper Co. 
ITT 
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 
1977 
1976 
1978 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Johnson & Johnson 1978 Coopers & Lybrand 
The LTV Corp. 
Litton Industries, Inc. 
1975 
1976 
Ernst & Ernst 
Touche Ross & Co. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
1977 
1977 
Ernst & Ernst 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
Owens-Illinois 
1976 
1977 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Arthur Young & Co. 
Republic Steel 1980 Ernst & Whinney 
The Signal Companies 
Standard Oi l Company (Indiana) 
1976 
1977 
Haskins & Sells 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Tenneco 1979 Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Union Oi l Co. 
Union Pacific Corp. 
1979 
1975 
Coopers& Lybrand 
Deloitte Haskins 4 Sells 
Weyerhaeuser 1977 Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Xerox Corporation 1977 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
No Annual Report Available to Researcher Amerada Hess Standard Oi l (Ohio) 
CBS Texaco 
Gulf Oi l Texas Instruments 
International Business Machines TRW 
Marathon Oi l United Brands 
Phillips Petroleum US Steel 
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